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Case No. 20100831 
INTHE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
vs. 
STEPHEN BRADLEY ADAMSON, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The State appeals from an order of dismissal following the suppression of 
evidence. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 77-18a-l(3)(b) 
(West Supp. 2006) and Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (West 2009). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Was the officer's investigation of Defendant following a traffic stop within 
the proper scope of the stop or otherwise supported by a reasonable, articulable 
suspicion of further illegality? 
Standard of Review. A trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to 
suppress is a mixed question of law and fact. The court's underlying factual 
findings are reviewed for clear error. State v. Krukowski, 2004 UT 94, f 11,100 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
P.3d 1222. The court's legal conclusions are reviewed non-deferentially for 
correctness, including its application of the legal standard to the facts. State v. 
Brake, 2004 UT 95, «|[ 11,103 P.3d 699. 
Presewation. The issue on appeal was preserved by the State in its memor-
andum and arguments opposing Defendant's motion to suppress, see R.89-92, 
R.140:ll-13, and in its motion to reconsider, R.89-92. The district court ruled on 
these motions in two memorandum decisions, see R.77-85,100-01, and in a final 
order which included findings of fact and conclusions of law, see R.103-09. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following provisions are reproduced in Addendum A: U.S. Const. 
amend. IV; Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-518.2 (West Supp. 2008); Utah Code Ann. § 
41-6a-530 (West Supp. 2007); Utah Code Ann. § 53-3-220 (West Supp. 2008). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with (1) driving under the influence of alcohol, a 
third degree felony; (2) violating a "no alcohol" driver's license restriction, a 
class B misdemeanor; (3) tampering with an ignition interlock system, a class B 
misdemeanor; (4) failure to signal, a class C misdemeanor; and (5) failure to 
illuminate the rear registration plate, a class C misdemeanor. R.l-3. After a 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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preliminary hearing, Defendant was bound over to district court to stand trial 
on all counts. R.27-28. 
Following bindover, Defendant moved to suppress the evidence, arguing 
that the officer's administration of field sobriety tests exceeded the permissible 
scope of the traffic stop. R.34-42. After an evidentiary hearing and oral 
argument, R.43,76, the district court granted Defendant's motion in a 
memorandum decision. R.77-86. The State moved to reconsider, but the court 
denied the motion. R.89-93,100-02. The district court then entered Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law, Order of Suppression, Order Denying Motion to 
Reconsider, and Final Order. R.103-10,123. The case was thereafter dismissed 
on the ground that suppression of the evidence substantially impaired the 
prosecution's case. R.132-33. The State timely appealed. R.134-35. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS1 
On the night of December 19, 2008, Trooper Cody McCoy and his DUI 
field training officer, Brian Spillman ("FTO Spillman"), were parked in their 
patrol car near the Duces Wild bar in the hope of making a DUI stop for training 
purposes. R.139:25,27,31 (R.104:^l,3). At approximately 10:30 p.m., the 
1
 The facts are taken primarily from testimony elicited at the suppression 
hearing on February 22, 2010. See R.139. Citations in parentheses refer to the 
district court's corresponding findings of fact or conclusions of law. 
-3-
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officers saw Defendant drive out of the bar's parking lot in a car without a 
working rear license plate light R.139: 8 (R.104:fl). The officers followed 
Defendant and saw him move "in the left-hand turning lane like [he] was going 
to turn onto the freeway without using a signal" and "[t]hen turn[ ] back into 
traffic without using a signal." R.139: 8-9,1445,26 (R.104:t2). The troopers 
activated their overhead lights and made a traffic stop. R.139: 9 (R.104:^ [4). 
Trooper McCoy approached the stopped car to make contact with 
Defendant; FTO Spillman remained in the patrol car. R.139:9,27 (R.104:Tf5). 
Trooper McCoy asked Defendant if he had his driver's license. R.139:10. 
Defendant responded in the affirmative and produced a card, which Trooper 
McCoy assumed was a driver's license. R.139:10 (R.104:^ |7). Trooper McCoy 
also requested Defendant's registration and insurance information, which 
Defendant produced. R.139:10 (R.1Q4:H5-7).2 Trooper McCoy had a difficult 
time understanding Defendant during their exchange because each time 
Defendant answered a question, "he'd look away" and speak "very quiet[ly]." 
R.139:10 (R.104:f 8). 
2
 The trial court also found that Trooper McCoy asked Defendant if he 
had been drinking, which Defendant denied. See R.104:^5,9. However, no 
testimony was elicited to that effect, at either the preliminary hearing, R.138, or 
the suppression hearing, R.139. 
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After collecting Defendant's documents, Trooper McCoy returned to the 
patrol car and informed FTO Spillman that he did not detect a distinctive odor 
of alcohol, R139:10,17,29 (R.104:! 110-11), "just a minty smell," R.139:17,29. He 
also explained, however, that Defendant "was really quiet." R.139:29. When 
examining Defendant's documents, the two officers discovered that Defendant 
had provided an identification card, not a driver's license. R.139:10-ll,27 
(R.105:f 12). The officers were nevertheless able to run a license check, which 
revealed that Defendant had a valid license, but was an "alcohol restricted 
driver." R.139:10-ll,27-28,32 (R.105:^13-14). As such, Defendant was 
(1) required to maintain an ignition interlock device in his vehicle, and (2) pro-
hibited from driving with a measurable or detectable amount of alcohol in his 
body. R.139:ll-12,28 (R.105:1J14); accord Utah Code Ann. § 53-3-220 (West Supp. 
2008). The computer check also revealed that Defendant had two prior DUI 
convictions, but no outstanding warrants. R.139:28 (R.105:^ [13). 
Given Defendant's prior DUI history, the fact that Defendant was "really 
quiet," and the possibility that the inexperienced trooper "might not have 
caught onto" the possibility Defendant had consumed alcohol, FTO Spillman 
told Trooper McCoy to have Defendant exit his car so that he could better assess 
whether Defendant had consumed alcohol. R.139:18,28-29. FTO Spillman also 
-5-
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asked Trooper McCoy to verify that the ignition interlock device was installed in 
Defendant's car. R.139:29 (R.105:^ [17). 
After discussing the case with FTO Spillman, Trooper McCoy returned to 
Defendant's car and asked Defendant whether he had an ignition interlock 
device installed. R.139:12 (R.105:^ [16). Defendant grabbed the device, turned to 
the trooper, and said, "Oh yeah, it's hanging right here." R.139:12 (R.105:fl7). 
When he did so, Trooper McCoy noticed for the first time the odor of alcohol 
coming from Defendant. R.139:12 (R.105:f 18). At that point, Trooper McCoy 
directed Defendant to step out of the car and again asked if he had his driver's 
license. R.139:13 (R.105:^15,18). Defendant said, "Oh, yeah," and gave the 
trooper his license. R.139:13. 
Trooper McCoy administered field sobriety tests, R.139:13 (R.104:^fl8), 
which Defendant failed, R.138:5~9,17-24. Following the field sobriety tests, 
Trooper McCoy arrested Defendant for DUI and several other offenses. 
(R.105:^ [19). Defendant was thereafter transported to the police station and 
asked to submit to an Intoxilyzer test. R.138:9. When Defendant refused the 
test, the troopers secured a warrant to draw a blood sample. R.138:9. A blood 
sample was drawn and tested, revealing a blood alcohol level of .26. R.138:10. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The district court concluded that Trooper McCoy exceeded the lawful 
scope of the traffic stop when he asked Defendant whether his vehicle was 
equipped with an ignition interlock device. This Court should reverse. 
The law is well settled that during a routine traffic stop, an officer may 
request the driver's license and conduct a computer check on that license. The 
purpose of such a license check is to confirm that the driver is legally authorized 
to operate the vehicle on the highways of the State. The United States Supreme 
Court has recognized that officers may verify compliance with licensing 
requirements, so long as the initial stop is lawful. Accordingly, where a 
computer check reveals that a driver's license to drive is subject to an ignition 
interlock system restriction, the officer may verify compliance with that 
restriction. The stop in this case was justified at its inception. Accordingly, 
when Trooper McCoy discovered that Defendant was an alcohol restricted 
driver, he properly verified that Defendant was in compliance with that 
licensing requirement. 
Even assuming, arguendo, that verification of Defendant's license 
restriction was beyond the proper scope of the stop, it was justified because 
Trooper McCoy had a reasonable, articulable suspicion that Defendant was in 
-7-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
violation of the law prohibiting alcohol restricted drivers from operating motor 
vehicles not equipped with the required ignition interlock system. Trooper 
McCoy did not observe the ignition interlock device during his initial exchange 
with Defendant. Accordingly, when he discovered that Defendant was an 
alcohol restricted driver, he had a reasonable suspicion that Defendant was in 
violation of the law, justifying further inquiry. 
Trooper McCoy's ensuing investigation was supported by reasonable 
suspicion of further illegality. After smelling alcohol from Defendant during 
their second exchange, Trooper McCoy had reasonable suspicion that Defendant 
had a measurable or detectable amount of alcohol in his body. The facts 
supporting a reasonable suspicion determination included: (1) Defendant drove 
out of a bar parking lot alone, (2) Defendant's driving was somewhat erratic, 
(3) Defendant was evasive when he initially spoke with Defendant, turning 
away from the trooper and speaking quietly when he answered questions, 
(4) Defendant had two prior DUI convictions and was currently an alcohol 
restricted driver, and (5) once Defendant faced Trooper McCoy to answer a 
question, the trooper smelled the odor of alcohol coming from Defendant. 
These facts, when considered together, support a finding of reasonable 
suspicion and outweigh any facts that would suggest otherwise. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE TROOPERS' DETENTION OF DEFENDANT WAS 
REASONABLE 
A traffic stop must meet two basic requirements to satisfy the Fourth 
Amendment. First, the stop must be "lawful at its inception," and second, the 
stop must be "executed in a reasonable manner." Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 
408 (2005). "If, during the scope of a traffic stop, the officer forms new 
reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity, the officer may also 
expediently investigate his new suspicion." State v. Baker, 2010 UT18, f^ 13,229 
P.3d 650. Otherwise, "the officer must allow the seized person to depart." Id. 
The stop at issue here satisfied both requirements. 
A. The traffic stop was justified at its inception. 
A traffic stop is justified at its inception if the officer has "probable cause 
or reasonable articulable suspicion of [a] traffic violation or other criminal 
activity." Baker, 2010 UT 18, <([ 16. In this case, Trooper McCoy observed that 
Defendant's "license plate light wasn't working," R.139:8 (R.104:|l),.a violation 
of the Utah Traffic Code. See Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-1604(2)(c) (West Supp. 
2005) (requiring the illumination of the rear registration plate). He also saw 
Defendant move into "the left turning l ane . . . without using a signal" and then 
"turn[ ] back into traffic without using a signal," R.139:8-9,14-15,26 (R.104:Tf2), 
-9-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
also a violation of the Traffic Code. See Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-804(l)(a) (West 
Supp. 2007) (requiring an appropriate signal when changing lanes). Such 
"observed traffic violation[s]" gave Trooper McCoy "'at the least, probable 
cause to believe [Defendant] had committed a traffic offense/ " State v. Lopez, 
873 P.2d 1127,1132 (Utah 1994) (quoting State v. Smith, 781 P.2d 879, 882 n.2 
(Utah App. 1989)). 
Indeed, in seeking suppression of the evidence below, Defendant "d[id] 
not argue that the stop itself was unlawful." R.79; see R.31-42,70-75. The district 
court also agreed that Troopers McCoy and Spillman "were justified in stopping 
the defendant for the improper lane change and burned out light." R.79. 
Accordingly, whether the stop was justified at its inception is not an issue on 
appeal. 
B. The stop was executed in a reasonable manner. 
A traffic stop, justified at its inception, must also be "executed in a 
reasonable manner." Caballes, 543 U.S. at 408. To comply with this requirement, 
the ensuing detention must be "'reasonably related in scope to the 
circumstances which justified the interference in the first place/ " Id. at 419 
(quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968)). The detaining officer must also 
"'diligently pursue[ ] a means of investigation'" that is likely to satisfy the 
-10-
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purpose of the stop in an expeditious manner. State v. Worwood, 2007 UT 47, f 
28,164 P.3d 397 (quoting United States v. Slmrpe, 470 U.S. 675,686 (1985)); accord 
Baker, 2010 UT 18, f 17. Typically, "the officer must allow the seized person to 
depart once the purpose of the [traffic] stop has concluded." Baker, 2010 UT 18, 
f 13. However, if "reasonable suspicion of a further illegality" arises during the 
lawful course of a stop, it may be appropriately extended to investigate that 
illegality. State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, f 31, 63 P.3d 650; accord Baker, 2010 UT 
18, If 13. 
ic * * 
The district court ruled that Trooper McCoy "impermissibly extended the 
scope of the detention beyond its original intent/7 to wit, " issuing citations for 
the minor traffic infractions." R.108:^ [^ f 12,17. The court concluded that under 
"[t]he totality of evidence that was available to Trooper McCoy/' he "did not 
have a reasonable, articulable suspicion of alcohol use to justify expanding the 
scope" of the stop. R.107:^9,13. This Court should reverse. Each of the 
trooper's actions was either "'reasonably related in scope to the circumstances 
which justified the interference in the first place/ " Caballes, 543 U.S. at 419 
(quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 20), or was supported by "reasonable suspicion of a 
further illegality," Hansen, 2002 UT 125, f 31. 
-11-
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1. Trooper McCoy's request for Defendant's driver's license and 
registration and his corresponding computer checks were 
reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified 
the stop in the first place. 
After stopping Defendant, Trooper McCoy requested his driver's license 
and registration. R.139:10 (R.104:^ [5). Although Defendant produced an 
identification card rather than a driver's license, the troopers were nevertheless 
able to run a computer check on the status of Defendant's driver's license. 
R.139:10-ll,27-28 (R.105:^12-13). That check revealed Defendant was an 
"alcohol restricted driver," meaning that his license to drive was restricted to 
vehicles equipped with an ignition interlock system. R.139:10-ll,27-28,32 
(R.l05:t1jl3-14); accord Utah Code Ann. § 53-3-220 (West Supp. 2008). 
In moving to suppress the evidence, Defendant did not challenge Trooper 
McCoy's request for his driver's license and registration, or the computer check 
on the status of his driver's license. See R.31-42,70-75. Nor did the district court 
find any police misconduct in those actions. See R.77-86,103-10. For good 
reason—the law is well established that" 'an officer conducting a routine traffic 
stop may request a driver's license and vehicle registration, [and] conduct a 
computer check'" to verify that information. Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1132 (quoting 
State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431,435 (Utah App. 1990)). 
-12-
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2. Trooper McCoy's inquiry as to whether Defendant's vehicle 
was equipped with an ignition interlock system was also 
reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified 
the stop in the first place. 
After running the computer checks and discussing the stop with FTO 
Spillman, Trooper McCoy walked back to the stopped car and asked Defendant 
whether he had the required ignition interlock system installed in his car. R.139: 
12,18,28-29 (R.105:fT[16-17). In response, Defendant grabbed the device/turned 
to the trooper, and said, "Oh yeah, it's hanging right here." R.139:12 
(R.105:fl6). When he did so, Trooper McCoy smelled the odor of alcohol 
coming from Defendant R139:12 (R.105:^|18). 
The district court ruled that Trooper McCoy's "subsequent questioning 
about the ignition interlock device was [not] an acceptable extension of the 
detention/' absent "a new reasonable, articulable suspicion that [Defendant] had 
been drinking and driving." R.81. The court then concluded that Trooper 
McCoy "did not have a reasonable, articulable suspicion of alcohol use" and 
thus "impermissibly extended the scope of the detention beyond its original 
intent" R.84 (R.107:^9-12). This Court should reverse. Verifying that a 
lawfully stopped driver is legally authorized to operate a vehicle on the 
highways of the State is reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that 
justified the stop in the first place. 
-13-
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As noted above, the law is settled that during the course of an ordinary 
traffic stop, an officer "'may request a driver's license and . . .conduct a 
computer check" on that license. Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1132 (Robinson, 797 P.2d at 
435). In State v. Chism, this Court reaffirmed that a driver lawfully stopped 
"must . . . produce his driver license and submit to confirmation of his or Iter 
driving privileges:' 2005 UT App 41, \ 15,107 P.3d 706 (emphasis added). In 
other words, the purpose in requesting a driver's license and conducting a 
corresponding computer check is to confirm that the driver is legally authorized 
to operate the vehicle. If the computer check reveals that the operator's 
privilege to drive is subject to certain conditions, it is only reasonable (and 
logical) that the officer may also verify that the driver has satisfied those 
conditions. Like a computer check, such confirmation imposes "no additional 
intrusion on the driver." Id. 
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has likewise recognized that during a 
routine traffic stop, an officer may properly investigate the authority of the 
driver to operate the vehicle. That court held that "[djuring a traffic stop for [a 
moving violation], a police officer is permitted to ask such questions, examine 
such documentation, and run such computer verifications as necessary to 
determine that the driver has a valid license and is entitled to operate tlte vehicle. 
-14-
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United States v. Wood, 106 F.3d 942,945 (10th Or. 1997) (emphasis added). The 
court also held that "[t]he officer may detain the driver and his vehicle as long 
as reasonably necessary to make these determinations and to issue a citation or 
warning." Id. Thus, as in Chism, the Tenth Circuit has recognized that an officer 
may take those steps reasonably necessary to confirm the subject's driving 
privileges. These holdings are consistent with Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 
(1979). 
In Prouse, the United States Supreme Court recognized that the "the States 
have a vital interest in ensuring that only those qualified to do so are permitted 
to operate motor vehicles, that these vehicles are fit for safe operation, and lience 
that licensing, registration, and vehicle inspection requirements are observed!' Id. at 
658 (emphasis added). The Court held that although police cannot conduct 
random checks to assure compliance, they may "check [a] driver's license" to 
drive "in those situations in which there is at least articulable and reasonable 
suspicion that a motorist is unlicensed or that an automobile is not registered, or 
tliat eitlter tlie vehicle or an occupant is otlierwise subject to seizure for violation of law." 
Id. at 663 (emphasis added). Accordingly, so long as a vehicle is lawfully 
stopped, the police officer may verify "that licensing .. .requirements are 
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observed." Id. at 658. And of course, it follows that if a license to drive is subject 
to restrictions, the officer may verify that those restrictions are satisfied. 
In sum, and contrary to the district court's ruling, further reasonable 
suspicion was not required for Trooper McCoy to confirm that Defendant 
satisfied his license restriction. Because the traffic stop was justified at its 
inception, he was justified in confirming that Defendant's "licen-
sing. . . requirements [were] observed." Id. at 658. This Court should thus 
reverse the ruling below.3 
3. Trooper McCoy's inquiry regarding the ignition interlock 
system was also supported by reasonable suspicion. 
Even assuming, arguendo, that Trooper McCoy's inquiry regarding the 
ignition interlock device required reasonable suspicion of further illegality, he 
had it. The law provides that "[a]n alcohol restricted driver that operates or is in 
actual physical control of a vehicle in this state without an ignition interlock 
system is guilty of a class B misdemeanor." Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-518.2(3) 
(West Supp. 2008). As found by the district court, Trooper McCoy did not see 
3
 In addition to verifying Defendant's registration and license status, 
Trooper McCoy ran a background check and learned that although Defendant 
had "no outstanding warrants, . . . he did have two prior DUI convictions." 
R.105:^[13. The law is settled that such checks are likewise within the proper 
scope of a traffic stop. See State v. Markland, 2005 UT 26, Tf 29, 112 P.3d 507 
(holding an officer may conduct "a warrants check.. . so long as the check does 
not unreasonably extend the time of detention"). 
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an ignition interlock device during his first interaction with Defendant. 
R.105:f 17. Accordingly, upon learning that Defendant was an alcohol restricted 
driver required to have an ignition interlock system in his car, Trooper McCoy 
had a reasonable, articulable suspicion that Defendant was in violation of the 
license restriction. Cf. State v. Naisbitt, 827 P.2d 969, 971 (Utah App. 1992) 
(holding an officer's "inability to determine whether [a] vehicle [is] properly 
licensed justifie[s] [a traffic] stop"). 
The district court suggested that Trooper McCoy also needed "reasonable, 
articulable suspicion of alcohol use to justify expanding the scope" to an inquiry 
regarding the ignition interlock device. R.84. However, alcohol use is not an 
element of the offense of driving without an ignition interlock system. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 41-6a-518.2(3). The court's ruling is incorrect and should be 
reversed. 
4. Trooper McCoy's ensuing investigation was supported by 
reasonable suspicion that Defendant was driving with a 
measurable or detectable amount of alcohol in his body. 
After detecting the odor of alcohol from Defendant, Trooper McCoy asked 
him to exit the vehicle and then administered field sobriety tests. See R.139:13 
(R.105:^fl8). Trooper McCoy was justified in administering those tests because 
-17-
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by that point, he had a reasonable, articulable suspicion that Defendant had 
consumed alcohol in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-530 (West Supp. 2007). 
Section 41-6a-530 provides that "[a]n alcohol restricted driver who 
operates or is in actual physical control of a vehicle in this state with any 
measurable or detectable amount of alcohol in the person's body is guilty of a 
class B misdemeanor/' Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-530(l). And under the statute, 
"[a] 'measurable or detectable amount' of alcohol" may be established by either 
a chemical test, other evidence, or a combination of both. Utah Code Ann. § 41-
6a-530(2). The facts known to Trooper McCoy established a reasonable, 
articulable suspicion that Defendant was in violation of this law. 
Two facts known to Trooper McCoy suggested no alcohol use or 
impairment: Trooper McCoy did not smell alcohol on Defendant during their 
first exchange, R.104:^ f 11; and Defendant was able to start his car 
notwithstanding the ignition interlock device, R.104:ffl,17. The remaining 
factors, however, overwhelm the facts suggesting no alcohol use. 
Facts supporting a reasonable suspicion of alcohol use and impairment 
included: (1) Defendant drove out of a bar parking lot alone, R.104:l[fl; 
(2) Defendant's driving was somewhat erratic —he drove into "the left-hand 
turning lane like [he] was going to turn onto the freeway without using a 
-18-
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signal/' but then "turned back into traffic without using a signal," R.139:8; 
(3) Defendant's head was "turned away from the trooper" and he "spoke with a 
quiet voice" when he answered the trooper's questions during their first 
exchange, R.104:Tf8; (4) Defendant had two prior DUI convictions and was 
currently an alcohol restricted driver, R.105:^ 13-14; and (5) once Defendant 
faced Trooper McCoy to answer a question, the trooper "smelled the odor of 
alcohol coming from [Defendant]," R.105:T|18.4 
These facts, when considered together, support a strong inference that 
Defendant had in fact consumed alcohol and may be impaired. Although 
Trooper McCoy could not smell alcohol initially, he did once Defendant faced 
him to indicate he had the ignition interlock device. And that revelation, in 
turn, supported a strong inference that in previously turning away from the 
trooper when speaking, Defendant was attempting to conceal his alcohol 
consumption, see R.139:ll-12—thus manifesting a consciousness of guilt 
regarding his driving. See State v. Smith, 927 P.2d 649, 653 (Utah App. 1996) 
4
 The district court noted that FTO Spillman testified that he had no 
articulable suspicion of alcohol consumption before he told Trooper McCoy to 
pull Defendant out of the car. See R.106:^22-23. Whether true or not, FTO 
Spillman remained in the patrol car when Trooper McCoy reapproached 
Defendant the second time and smelled alcohol, which occurred before 
Defendant was asked to exit the vehicle. See R.105:^16-18. 
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(holding defendant's "attempt[ ] to conceal the drug paraphernalia tendjed] to 
show consciousness of his potential guilt regarding manslaughter"); see also 
Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119,124 (2000) (holding "nervous, evasive behavior 
is a pertinent factor in determining reasonable suspicion''). 
The only fact remaining that suggested Defendant had not been drinking 
was his ability to start his car, notwithstanding the ignition interlock device. But 
ignition interlock devices are not tamper proof, as Defendant himself confirmed 
to the officers following his arrest. See R.138:28-29 (admitting ignition interlock 
device could be bypassed and he had in fact done so in the past). And, as noted, 
Defendant's evasive behavior suggested that he had something to hide. Added 
to that, Trooper McCoy determined that Defendant's driving pattern suggested 
possible impairment. See R.139:15; accord R.138:16. 
In sum, when the facts are viewed as a comprehensive whole, they 
support a reasonable suspicion that "criminal activity may be afoot," Terry, 392 
U.S. at 21,30, to wit, that Defendant was driving with a measurable amount of 
alcohol in the body and may also be impaired. The fact that Defendant's car had 
an interlock device was not sufficient to dispel the officers' suspicions where 
(1) defendant drove away from the bar alone; (2) Trooper McCoy smelled 
alcohol on Defendant; and (3) Defendant manifested a guilty conscience through 
-20-
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his evasive behavior. Moreover, Defendant's prior DUI record, including the 
fact he was still an alcohol restricted driver, added further to the reasonable 
suspicion calculus. See State v. Keener, 2008 UT App 288, f 12 n.6,191 P.3d 835 
(recognizing a suspect's criminal history "may be part of the circumstances 
considered in a probable cause determination"), cert, denied, 205 P.3d 103 (Utah 
2009); accord United States v. Dyer, 580 F.3d 386, 392 (6th Cir. 2009) (holding "a 
'person of reasonable caution' would take into account predilections revealed by 
past crimes or convictions as part of the inquiry into probable cause").5 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should reverse the ruling of the 
district court. 
The district court's findings and conclusions on the troopers' assessment 
of reasonable suspicion overstate their testimony. The court concluded that 
"both'[troopers] admitted . . . under cross examination they had no reasonable 
articulable suspicion to continue the detention." R.108:f 14; see also R.106:f ^22-
23. But Trooper McCoy was never asked to address his legal assessment of 
reasonable suspicion. See R.139:6-23. And FTO Spillman testified that in 
deciding to have Trooper McCoy pull Defendant out of the car, his assessment 
of reasonable suspicion was based on Defendant's (1) no alcohol restriction, 
(2) requirement to have an ignition interlock device, and (3) prior DUI history. 
R.139:32. He also testified on direct examination that Trooper McCoy's 
inexperience and the fact Defendant "was really quiet" played a role in directing 
Trooper McCoy to pull Defendant out of the car. See R.139:28-29. The district 
court's findings and conclusions suggesting more than this are clearly 
erroneous. See Krukowski, 2004 UT 94, % 11 (recognizing that factual findings 
may be reversed if clearly erroneous). 
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U.S. Const, amend IV 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to 
be seized. 
Utah Code Ann. § 53-3-220(1) (a) (West Supp. 2008) 
(l)(a) The division shall immediately revoke or, when this chapter or Title 
41, Chapter 6a, Traffic Code, specifically provides for denial, suspension, or 
disqualification, the division shall deny, suspend, or disqualify the license of a 
person upon receiving a record of the person's conviction for: 
* * * 
(xv) operating or being in actual physical control of a motor vehicle 
while having any measurable or detectable amount of alcohol in the 
person's body in violation of Section 41-6a-530; 
* * * 
(xvii) operating or being in actual physical control of a motor vehicle in 
this state without an ignition interlock system in violation of Section 41-6a-
518.2. 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-518.2 (West Supp. 2008) 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "ignition interlock system" means a constant monitoring device or 
any similar device that: 
(i) is in working order at the time of operation or actual physical 
control; and 
(ii) is certified by the Commissioner of Public Safety in accordance 
with Subsection 41-6a-518(8); and 
(b) (i) "interlock restricted driver" means a person who: 
(A) has been ordered by a court or the Board of Pardons and Parole 
as a condition of probation or parole not to operate a motor vehicle 
without an ignition interlock system; 
(B)(1) within the last three years has been convicted of an offense 
that occurred after May 1, 2006 which would be a conviction as defined 
under Section 41-6a-501; and 
(II) the offense described under Subsection (l)(b)(i)(B)(1) is 
committed within ten years from the date that one or more prior 
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offenses was committed if the prior offense resulted in a conviction as 
defined in Subsection 41-6a-501 (2); 
(C) within the last three years has been convicted of a violation of 
this section; 
(D) within the last three years has had the person's driving privilege 
revoked for refusal to submit to a chemical test under Section 41-6a-520, 
which refusal occurred after May 1, 2006; 
(E) within the last three years has been convicted of a violation of 
Section 41-6a-502 and was under the age of 21 at the time the offense 
was committed; 
(F) within the last six years has been convicted of a felony violation 
of Section 41-6a-502 for an offense that occurred after May 1,2006; or 
(G) within the last ten years has been convicted of automobile 
homicide under Section 76-5-207 for an offense that occurred after May 
1,2006; and 
(ii) " interlock restricted driver" does not include a person if: 
(A) the person's conviction described in Subsection (l)(b)(i)(B)(1) is a 
conviction under Section 41-6a-517; and 
(B) all of the person's prior convictions described in Subsection 
(l)(b)(i)(B)(II) are convictions under Section 41-6a-517. 
(2) For purposes of this section, a plea of guilty or no contest to a violation of 
Section 41-6a-502 which plea was held in abeyance under Title 11, Chapter 2a, 
Pleas in Abeyance, prior to July 1, 2008, is the equivalent of a conviction, even if 
the charge has been subsequently reduced or dismissed in accordance with the 
plea in abeyance agreement. 
(3) An interlock restricted driver that operates or is in actual physical control 
of a vehicle in this state without an ignition interlock system is guilty of a class B 
misdemeanor. 
(4) (a) It is an affirmative defense to a charge of a violation of Subsection (3) 
if: 
(i) an interlock restricted driver: 
(A) operated or was in actual physical control of a vehicle owned by 
the interlock restricted driver's employer; 
(B) had given written notice to the employer of the interlock 
restricted driver's interlock restricted status prior to the operation or 
actual physical control under Subsection (4) (a)(i); and 
(C) had on the interlock restricted driver's person or in the vehicle at 
the time of operation or physical control proof of having given notice to 
the interlock restricted driver's employer; and 
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(ii) the operation or actual physical control under Subsection 
(4)(a)(i)(A) was in the scope of the interlock restricted driver's 
employment. 
(b) The affirmative defense under Subsection (4)(a) does not apply to: 
(i) an employer-owned motor vehicle that is made available to an 
interlock restricted driver for personal use; or 
(ii) a motor vehicle owned by a business entity that is all or partly 
owned or controlled by the interlock restricted driver. 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-530 (West Supp. 2007) 
(1) An alcohol restricted driver who operates or is in actual physical control 
of a vehicle in this state with any measurable or detectable amount of alcohol in 
the person's body is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 
(2) A "measurable or detectable amount" of alcohol in the person's body 
may be established by: 
(a) a chemical test; 
(b) evidence other than a chemical test; or 
(c) a combination of Subsections (2) (a) and (b). 
(3) For any person convicted of a violation of this section, the court shall 
order the installation of an ignition interlock system as a condition of probation 
in accordance with Section 41-6a-518 or describe on the record or in a minute 
entry why the order would not be appropriate. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW, ORDER OF SUPPRESSION, 
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 
RECONSIDER, AND FINAL ORDER 
Case No. 091901221 
Judge Randall N. Skanchy 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress came before the court for an evidentiary hearing 
on March 22, 2010. 
The State was represented by its counsel, Roger S. Blaylock, and the Defendant 
was represented by his counsel, Walter F. Bugden, Jr. and John W. Anderson. 
The court received evidence which consisted of the sworn testimony of Utah 
Highway Patrol Trooper Cody McCoy and his field training officer Trooper Brian 
Spillman. 
The matter was taken under advisement. 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STEPHEN BRADLEY ADAMSON, 
Defendant. 
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The Court now enters the following Findings of Fact: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. At approximately 10:30 p.m., on December 19, 2008, Trooper McCoy and 
his field training officer, Trooper Spillman, observed a car leaving a bar parking lot with 
a non-operational rear license plate light. 
2. The troopers also observed the vehicle to make an improper lane change. 
3. The troopers conceded that they were waiting in this location in order to 
make a DUI stop for training purposes. 
4. A training stop indeed ensued. 
5. Trooper McCoy approached the driver of the vehicle, the Defendant 
Stephen Adamson, and asked for his license and registration and asked if he had been 
drinking. 
6. Mr. Adamson handed the trooper his registration. 
7. Trooper McCoy thought he had received Mr. Adamson's driver's license. 
8. Mr. Adamson spoke in a quiet voice with his head turned aligkay away 
from the trooper. 
9. Mr. Adamson told the trooper that he had not been drinking. 
10. Trooper McCoy returned to his own patrol vehicle to perform a warrants 
check. 
11. Trooper McCoy told his field training officer that there was no smell of 
alcohol coming from Mr. Adamson. 
2 
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12. Upon examination of the material provided by Mr. Adamson, the troopers 
realized that Mr. Adamson had given Trooper McCoy a rogiotratioircard, but not his 
driver's license. 
13. Nevertheless, the troopers ran a computer check in their patrol vehicle 
and determined that Mr. Adamson had a valid Utah driver's license, no outstanding 
warrants, but he did have two prior DUI convictions. 
14. The computer check also revealed that Mr. Adamson was an alcohol 
restricted driver and was required to maintain an ignition interlock device installed in his 
car. 
15. Trooper McCoy returned to Mr. Adamson's vehicle and requested his 
driver's license. 
16. Trooper McCoy also asked Mr. Adamson about the existence of an 
ignition interlock devise. 
17. Ignition interlock was installed, but Trooper McCoy had not noticed it 
during his first interaction with Mr. Adamson when the odor of alcohol was detected. 
18. During this second exchange, Trooper McCoy smelled the odor of alcohol 
coming from Mr. Adamson. Trooper McCoy asked Mr. Adamson to exit his vehicle and 
field sobriety test were performed. 
19. Mr. Adamson was arrested and charged with a variety of crimes including 
Driving under the Influence. 
20. At the preliminary hearing on October 6, 2009, Trooper McCoy and his 
training officer, Trooper Spillman both testified. 
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21. Trooper McCoy stated that he expanded the scope of the stop because of 
Mr. Adamson's previous DUI's and the requirement that he maintain an ignition interlock 
system. 
22. However, Trooper Spillman acknowledged that Trooper McCoy had no 
articulable suspicion of alcohol consumption when he returned to Mr. Adamson's car the 
second time after conducting the warrants check. 
23. Furthermore, Trooper Spillman agreed under cross examination that he 
did not have an articulable suspicion,-much legs a reasonable* ons^that justified a 
further investigation after the troopers determined that Mr. Adamson's license was valid 
and that there was no odor of alcohol emanating from his person. 
BASED UPON the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now enters the 
following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Fourth Amendment guarantees "the right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable seizures." U.S. 
Const. Fourth Amendment. 
2. Stopping a vehicle and detaining its occupants constitutes a seizure under 
the Fourth Amendment. State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1131 (Utah 1974). 
3. The Fourth Amendment prohibits only unreasonable searches and 
seizures. 
4. The Court therefore must embark upon a two part analysis to determine 
whether Trooper McCoy's conduct was reasonable. 
4 
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5. First, the Court must decide whether the officer's actions were justified at 
the inception of the stop. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1131-32. 
6. Next, the Court must determine if the resulting detention was reasonably 
related to the circumstances that justified the stop in the first place. State v. Chapman, 
921 P.2d 446, 450 (Utah 1995). 
7. Once a stop has been made, the detention "must be temporary and last 
no longer than necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop." Chapman at 452. 
8. Further detention for questioning constitutes an illegal seizure unless the 
officer has a reasonable, articulable, suspicion of further illegal activity. Lopez, 873 
P.2d 1131, see also State v. Worwood, 2007 UT47, at paragraph 33; 167 P.3d 397. 
9. The totality of evidence that was available to Trooper McCoy at the initial 
stop was insufficient to expand the scope of the search. 
10. The sole facts to support the first stop were the officers witnessing Mr. 
Adamson leaving a bar parking lot at night with an inoperable rear license plate light, 
and an improper lane change. 
11. During the initial contact with Mr. Adamson, Trooper McCoy observed only 
a soft voice and the lack of direct facial contact with the trooper. 
12. The court concludes that Officer McCoy impermissibly extended the scope 
of the detention beyond its original intent. 
13. In weighing the evidence, Trooper McCoy did not have a reasonable, 
articulable suspicion of alcohol use to justify expanding the scope. 
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14. Trooper McCoy and Spillman both admitted precisely this point under 
cross examination they had no reasonable articulable suspicion to continue the 
detention. 
15. Mr. Adamson's prior criminal record carries only minimal weight, and by 
itself, is inadequate to justify infringing one's right to privacy. 
16. Trooper Spillman admitted at the preliminary hearing that: "We were trying 
to find someone who was driving impaired so [McCoy] could have the experience of 
field sobriety tests and arresting an impaired driver." Yet Mr. Adamson was pulled over 
for unrelated infractions. 
17. Therefore, leaving the sole reason for expanding the scope to Mr. 
Adamson's stop beyond issuing the citations for the minor traffic infractions was Mr. 
Adamson's criminal record. 
18. "Criminal history alone is insufficient to give rise to the necessary 
reasonable suspicion to shift the focus of the traffic stop to an investigation of criminal 
activity." State v. Dennis, 2007 UT App. 266 at paragraph 12, (citation omitted). 
19. Mr. Adamson was pulled over for a non-operational rear license plate and 
an improper lane change. 
20. After initial stop, Trooper McCoy and Trooper Spillman both 
acknowledged that they had no articulable suspicion to continue the detention. 
21. This is all the troopers had to extend the detention and it is constitutionally 
inadequate to extend the detention. 
6 
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BASED UPON the foregoing Conclusions of Law, the Court now enters the 
Orders as follows: 
ORDER OF SUPPRESSION 
1. The Court grants the Defendant's motion to suppress. 
2. The State's Motion to Reconsider is denied. 
3. The resulting evidence from the unlawful seizure of the Defendant which 
proceeded from extending the scope of the detention impermissibly must be 
suppressed under the exclusionary rule. State v. Worwood, 2007 UT47, 167 
P.3d 397. (the exclusionary rule keeps out of trial evidence obtained through a 
violation of an individuals constitutional rights.) 
4. This is the final Order in this matter. 
DATED this & 2 d a y of^S^2010. 
BY THE COURT: 
Judge R Skahchy 
;>
 .TC **) 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 
Plaintiff, : CASE NO. 091901221 
vs • : 
STEPHEN B. ADAMSON, : Judge Randall N. Skanchy 
Defendant. : 
Before the Court is defendant Stephen Adamson's Motion to Suppress. 
The matter has been fully briefed by the parties, evidence was presented, 
and oral argument was held March 22, 2010, after which the Court took the 
matter under advisement. Accordingly, the matter is now ready for the 
Court's decision. 
BACKGROUND 
At approximately 10:30 p.m., on December 19, 2008, Utah Highway 
Patrol Trooper Cody McCoy ("Trooper McCoy") and his Field Training 
Officer, Trooper Brian Spillman ("Trooper Spillman"), observed a car 
leaving a bar parking lot with a non-operational rear license plate light 
and thereafter saw the vehicle make an improper lane change. The 
Troopers were admittedly waiting in this location in order to make a DUI 
stop for training purposes. A traffic stop ensued. Trooper McCoy asked 
the driver, defendant Stephen Adamson ("Mr. Adamson"), for his license 
and registration and asked him if he had been drinking. Mr. Adamson 
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STATE V. ADAMSON PAGE 2 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
handed the trooper his registration, what Trooper McCoy thought to be a 
driver's license, and, in a quiet voice, with his head turned away from 
the Trooper, Mr. Adamson responded that he had not been drinking. 
Trooper McCoy returned to his own vehicle for a warrant check and told 
Trooper Spillman that there had not been the smell of alcohol coming from 
Mr. Adamson. Upon examination of the material Mr. Adamson had provided, 
the Troopers realized that Mr. Adamson had given Trooper McCoy a 
registration card., rather than his driver's license. Nevertheless, the 
troopers were able to run a computer check on Mr. Adamson which indicated 
that he had a valid driver's license, no outstanding warrants, and two 
prior DUI convictions. The computer check also noted that Mr. Adamson 
was an alcohol restricted driver, and was required to have an ignition 
interlock device installed in his car. Trooper 'McCoy returned to Mr. 
Adamson's vehicle, asked for his driver's license, and asked Mr. Adamson 
about the existence of the interlock device. During this exchange 
Trooper McCoy smelled the odor of alcohol emanating from Mr. Adamson. 
Trooper McCoy then asked Mr. Adamson to exit his vehicle, and field 
sobriety tests were performed, whereafter Mr. Adamson was charged with 
driving under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs, among other crimes. 
Mr. Adamson moves the Court to suppress the results of the field 
sobriety tests, the chemical tests and Mr. Adamson's statements, arguing 
that the question regarding the interlock device and the sobriety tests 
were unlawful because they extended beyond the scope of the initial 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
STATE V. ADAMSON PAGE 3 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
purpose of the traffic stop. The State argues that the investigation for 
traffic infractions properly grew into an investigation of driving under 
the influence. 
DISCUSSION 
The Fourth Amendment guarantees the "right of the people to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const, amend. IV. Stopping a 
vehicle and detaining its occupants constitutes a seizure under the 
Fourth Amendment. State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1131 (Utah 1994). 
Although police must have a warrant to conduct most searches and 
seizures, "officers may temporarily detain a vehicle and its occupants 
upon reasonable suspicion of criminal activity for the purpose of 
conducting a limited investigation of the suspicion." State v. Baker, 
2010 UT 18, % 11, 651 Utah Adv. Rep. 25 (citation omitted). 
Because the Fourth Amendment prohibits only unreasonable searches 
and seizures, the Court must conduct a two-part analysis to determine 
whether Trooper McCoy's conduct was reasonable. First, the Court must 
decide whether the officer's actions were justified at the inception of 
the stop. Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1131-32. Mr. Adamson does not argue that 
the stop itself was unlawful, as the officers were justified in stopping 
the defendant for the improper lane change and burned out light. 
Next, the Court must determine whether the resulting detention was 
reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the stop 
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in the first place. State v. Chapman, 921 P.2d 446, 450 (Utah 1995). 
Generally, once a stop has been made, the detention "must be temporary 
and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the 
stop.". Id. at 452. Further detention for questioning constitutes an 
illegal seizure unless the officer has a reasonable, articulable 
suspicion of further illegality. Lopez,, 873 P. 2d at 1132; see also State 
v. Worwood, 2007 UT 47, ^ 33, 164 P.3d 397 (citation omitted). 
Reasonable suspicion means suspicion based on specific, articulable facts 
drawn from the totality of the circumstances facing the officer at the 
time of the stop." Lopez., 873 P. 2d at 1132. Without further evidence 
of criminal activity, law enforcement must either arrest, cite or release 
the driver. State v. Chapman, 921 P.2d 446, 453 (Utah 1995) . The Court 
must view the facts behind the officer's suspicion in light of common 
sense, granting deference to an officer's ability to detect suspicious 
actions. Id. However, the officer may not rely on merely an "inchoate 
and unparticularized suspicion" or hunch. Id. 
The parties disagree as to whether the subsequent detention was 
based on a reasonable articulable suspicion of other criminal behavior. 
The State argues that while conducting the traffic stop for Mr. Adams on's 
burned out light and improper lane change, Trooper McCoy formed a new 
reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity as justification 
for further questioning. In particular, the computer check on Mr. 
Adamson informed the officers of Mr. Adamson's prior DUIs and that he was 
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required to have an interlock system installed in his car. The State 
argues that it was permissible for Trooper McCoy to inquire about the 
interlock device, and when he smelled alcohol on the defendant's breath, 
he was entitled to extend the detention. 
The question before the Court is whether subsequent questioning 
about the ignition interlock device was an acceptable extension of the 
detention. Subsequently, his questioning would be acceptable if the 
Trooper had a new reasonable, articulable suspicion that Mr. Adamson had 
been drinking and driving. The reasonableness of an officer's conduct 
requires a fact-specific analysis where courts generally weigh the 
articulable facts against one's Fourth Amendment rights against 
unreasonable search and seizure. Case law assists in the determination 
of where this dividing line should be. 
In State v. Chapman, the defendant was loitering in a parked car in 
a school parking lot after hours with a woman. The officer was made 
aware after the initial detention that the defendant was an alleged gang 
member and had been armed in the past. A Terry frisk was performed and 
the defendant was unarmed. The suspect admitted to the officer that he 
had a gun in the vehicle, which was recovered and a weapons check 
indicated the gun was stolen. The Utah Supreme Court acknowledged that 
a Terry frisk was acceptable for the officer's safety but once the man 
"was outside the vehicle and known to be unarmed, however, the officers 
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had no reasonable, articulable suspicion either to continue questioning 
him regarding weapons or to search for them." Jd. at 453 
In State v. Lafond, 2003 UT App 101, 68 P.3d 1043, officers stopped 
the defendant's car for speeding and a burned out light. The stop 
expanded into a possible DUI. The Utah Court of Appeals.held that the 
officers had reasonable suspicion to expand the scope of the stop. In 
the State's favor was evidence that the driver had a suspended license 
for DUI, and the officer noted a large, refillable cup in the console and 
a bag with a whiskey insignia. The officer also noted the passenger's 
strange movement to retrieve a small bag. Taken in their totality, the 
articulable • facts, as well as the officer's experience, justified 
reasonable suspicion of more serious criminal activity. 
Finally, in State v. Dennis, 2007 UT App 266, 167 P.3d 528, the 
court upheld a traffic stop that had expanded from a cracked windshield 
violation into an arrest for drugs and stolen items. The court held that 
the officers met the reasonable suspicion burden as a result of the 
following facts: it was the middle of the night, the car was near a motel 
known for drug dealings, the .officers knew of the occupants' prior 
criminal histories and alleged drug use, and stereo equipment and drug 
paraphernalia were visible in the back seat. Although the Court of 
Appeals upheld the arrest as legitimate, it noted that any one of the 
officers' rationales, for expanding the stop, by itself, would not rise 
to the level of reasonable suspicion. In particular, the Court noted 
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that prior " [c] riminal history alone is 'insufficient to give rise to the 
necessary reasonable suspicion' to shift the focus of a traffic stop to 
an investigation of criminal activity." Id. at f 12 (citing United 
States'v. Sandoval, 29 F.3d 537, 543 (10th Cir. 1994) ("If the law were 
otherwise, any person with any sort of criminal record . . . could be 
subjected to a Terry-type investigative stop by a law enforcement officer 
at any time without the need for any other justification at all.") ) . The 
totality of the evidence in Dennis was the basis for the officer's 
reasonable articulable suspicion of further criminal activity. Id. 
In this case, Mr. Adamson argues that Trooper McCoy did not have 
reasonable suspicion to expand the scope of the stop from an improper 
lane change and burned out light to one for DUI. He points out that 
McCoy did not smell the odor of alcohol on him during their first 
encounter, and it was only after McCoy asked Mr. Adamson about the 
interlock device did the trooper notice the smell. Mr. Adamson argues 
that the officer had no right to ask about the interlock system, as 
intoxicated driving was not the purpose of the initial stop. 
During the preliminary hearing on October 6, 2009, Trooper McCoy and 
his training officer, Trooper Spillman, both testified. Trooper McCoy 
stated that he expanded the scope of the stop because of Mr. Adamson7s 
previous DUIs and the required interlock system required. Trooper 
Spillman testified that he suggested Trooper McCoy investigate potential 
alcohol use-because: 
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Obviously the driver had a lengthy history with DUI arrests. 
I was concerned. A lot of time some alcoholic beverages are 
tough to detect. Even for seasoned officers there's some 
alcoholic beverages that are hard to smell. [Trooper McCoy] 
did state that, that he was really quiet and so I was 
concerned that he might have not caught on to the fact that he 
was actually consuming alcohol at that time. 
Trooper Spillman further acknowledged that Trooper McCoy had no 
articulable suspicion of alcohol consumption when he first returned, to 
the patrol car. 
The totality of evidence that was available to Trooper McCoy at the 
initial stop was insufficient to expand the scope of the search. The 
sole facts to support the first stop were the officers witnessing Mr. 
Adamson's leaving a bar parking lot at night, with an inoperable rear 
license plate light and an improper lane change, a soft voice at the stop 
and lack of direct facial contact with the Trooper. 
The Court determines that Officer McCoy impermissibly extended the 
scope of the detention beyond its original intent. In weighing the 
evidence, McCoy did not have a reasonable, articulable .suspicion of 
alcohol use to justify expanding the scope. Mr. Adamson's prior criminal 
record carries only minimal weight, and by itself is inadequate to 
justify infringing one's right to privacy. Trooper Spillman admitted at 
the preliminary hearing: "we were trying to find someone that was driving 
impaired so that [McCoy] could have the experience of, of field sobriety 
tests and arresting an impaired driver." Yet Mr. Adamson was pulled 
over because of unrelated infractions, leaving the sole reason for 
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expanding the stop Mr. Adamson's criminal record. As the Utah Court of 
Appeals held, u[c]riminal history alone is xinsufficient to give rise 
to the necessary reasonable suspicion7 to shift the focus of a traffic 
stop to an investigation of criminal activity." State v. Dennis, 2007 
UT App 266 at ^  12 (citation omitted) . 
CONCLUSION1 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants the defendant's Motion 
to Suppress. "[E]ven a small intrusion beyond the legitimate scope of an 
initially lawful search is unlawful under the Fourth Amendment." State 
v. Baker, 2010 UT 18 at % 28 (Utah 2010) (citing Schlosser, 774 P.2d at 
1135). The resulting evidence from the unlawful seizure must be 
suppressed under the exclusionary rule. See State v. Worwood, 2007 UT 
47, P42 (Utah 2007) (the exclusionary rule keeps out of trial evidence 
obtained through a violation of an individual's constitutional rights). 
RANDALL N. SKANClhf- L:.'r^,-- . .'V :! ' ;• 
DISTRICT COURT[ JUDGE :\;; •;. '.; ^ ]}: , 
1
 The State does not argue the inevitable discovery doctrine; asiucHTthe Court 
did not consider its merits. See State v. Worwood, 2007 UT 47,143, 164 P.3d 397 (the 
inevitable discovery doctrine requires "persuasive evidence that events apart from those 
resulting in illegal police activity that would have inevitably led to discovery for causal 
link between initial illegality and evidence to be broken."). 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 
Plaintiff, : CASE NO. 091901221 
vs. : 
STEPHEN B. ADAMSON, : Judge Randall N. Skanchy 
. Defendant. : 
The Court has before it the State of Utah's ("State") Motion for 
reconsideration of the Court's earlier decision on defendant Stephen B. 
Adamson's ("Mr. Adamson") Motion to Suppress. The matter has been fully 
briefed by the parties and argued to the Court on June 7, 2010. The 
Court, having considered the Motion to Reconsider, hereby denies the 
same. The State cannot prolong a detention without reasonable articulable 
suspicion. -State v. Chapman, 921 P.2d 446, 453 (Utah 1995). 
In ths case, Mr. Adamson was pulled over for a non-operational rear 
license plate light and an improper lane change. After the initial stop, 
Trooper McCoy and Trooper Spillman both acknowledge they had no 
articulable suspicion to continue the detention. "Criminal history alone 
is insufficient to give rise to the necessary reasonable suspicion to 
shift the focus of a traffic stop to an investigation of criminal 
activity." State v. Dennis, 2007 UT App 266 ^ 12, 167 P.3d 528 (internal 
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quotation marks omitted). This is all the troopers had and it isn't 
enough under the case law. of this state. 
Accordingly, the Motion to Reconsider is hereby denied, and counsel 
for Mr. Adamson is directed to prepare Findings and an Order consistent 
with the Court's ruling. 
Dated this O day of June, 2010
 (t .... . .  ^  . ^ 
\ 
v?*^^. 
RANDALL N. SKANCHY 
DISTRICT COURT \jyDGE 
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